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SAVING LAW REVIEWS FROM POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: A DEFENSE OF
LAWYERS, LAW PROFESSORS, AND LAW REVIEWS
Benjamin H. Barton1
This essay reviews Robert J. Spitzer, Saving the Constitution from Lawyers: How Legal
Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning, and argues that it fails on
two fronts. First, I offer a defense of lawyers, law professors, and law reviews. Second, I
show that Spitzer's own book proves that peer-reviewed political science scholarship
suffers from at least as many faults and foibles as law review scholarship.
For example, in each of his three examples of wayward theorizing Spitzer insists that his
reading of the Constitution and its history is so clearly correct that his opponents'
scholarship is not only wrong on the merits, but is so bad that it is affirmatively
dangerous and never should have been published. The efficacy of these arguments is
crippled, however, by claim that the individual rights theory of the Second Amendment is
fatally, obviously, and laughably wrong as a matter of constitutional theory, case law,
and history. Unfortunately for Spitzer the Supreme Court held the exact opposite by a
vote of 9-0 in District of Columbia v. Heller months after the publication of the book.
Further, Spitzer presents a remarkably weak case of causation between his alleged faulty
scholarship and any resulting governmental actions. Even if Spitzer is correct that the
scholarship he highlights is fatally wrong, it is quite a leap to say that this scholarship
caused executive branch actions like George W. Bush's claim of expansive executive
powers after 9/11 or George H.W. Bush's claim of an inherent line item veto.

SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM LAWYERS: HOW LEGAL TRAINING AND LAW REVIEWS
DISTORT CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING. By Robert J. Spitzer. New York: Cambridge
University Press. 2008. Pp. ix, 195. $85.00.

Robert J. Spitzer is one of America’s best known Political Scientists. He’s
written over three hundred articles and multiple highly influential books. He’s been
repeatedly honored for his work and has been a leader in the American Political Science
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Association, the premier American political science organization.2 When Robert Spitzer
writes a book published by the Cambridge University Press that argues that legal training
and law reviews gravely “distort” the Constitution itself and concludes that the
Constitution thus needs “saving” from lawyers, the claim is serious enough to require a
response.
Spitzer’s argument relies upon three central criticisms of American lawyers and
law professors. First, Spitzer suggests that lawyers are congenitally disposed to ignore
the truth in favor of their clients’ selfish interests. Second, Spitzer argues that law
professors are ill suited to analyze the Constitution (and maybe law as a whole) because
they are trained as lawyers/advocates, rather than in the more neutral scientific method
(like political scientists). Last, Spitzer asserts that student-edited law reviews compound
the above errors by publishing law professors’ facially erroneous Constitutional
interpretations. These inaccurate interpretations are then used to distort and subvert
constitutional meaning.
Any law professor who has stood still in front political scientist or an economist
will recognize these three criticisms, and Spitzer himself makes no claim that they are
particularly original.3 Spitzer’s most original claim is that the combination of law
professors disinclined to seek, or incapable of seeking, the truth in their scholarship with
poorly edited student law reviews results in dangerous scholarship that does affirmative
harm to the constitution, and the heart of the book is Spitzer’s three examples of
“wayward constitutional theorizing.” On the surface I quite like this argument: it is
2
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simple and bold and attempts to connect three common criticisms into a much larger
indictment of American constitutional theorizing.4
Nevertheless, after reading the book several times I conclude that both the
underlying criticisms and Spitzer’s examples do not add up to much. This review seeks
to debunk Spitzer’s contention on two fronts. First, I offer a defense of lawyers, law
professors, and law reviews. Second, I show that Spitzer’s own book proves that peerreviewed political science scholarship suffers from at least as many faults and foibles as
law review scholarship.
For example, in each of his three examples of wayward theorizing Spitzer insists
that his reading of the Constitution and its history is so clearly correct that his opponents’
scholarship is not only wrong on the merits, but is so bad that it is affirmatively
dangerous and never should have been published. The efficacy of these arguments is
crippled, however, by Spitzer’s third example, the Second Amendment. Spitzer claims
that the individual rights theory of the second amendment is fatally, obviously, and
laughably wrong, both as a matter of constitutional theory, case law and history.5
Unfortunately for Spitzer the Supreme Court held the exact opposite by a vote of 9-0 in
District of Columbia v. Heller6 months after the publication of the book.
Further, Spitzer presents a remarkably weak case of causation between his alleged
faulty scholarship and any resulting governmental actions. Even if Spitzer is correct that
the scholarship he highlights is fatally wrong, it is quite a leap to say that this scholarship
4
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caused executive branch actions like George W. Bush’s claim of expansive executive
powers after 9/11 or George H.W. bush’s claim of an inherent line item veto.
Part I describes Spitzer’s argument more fully. Part II argues that Spitzer’s
criticisms of lawyers, law professors and law reviews are wrong in important ways that
undermine his thesis. Part III then demonstrates how Spitzer’s own examples show the
failings of his arguments with particular clarity.
I.

The Argument in Brief
Spitzer’s argument consists of three parts. The first two chapters lay out the dual

theoretical underpinnings of the book: Chapter One argues that by training and nature
lawyers and law professors don’t care about the truth, only advocating a position, and
Chapter Two notes that student-edited law reviews compound this problems. The last
part of the argument stretches across chapters 3-5, where Spitzer lays out three examples
of poor law review scholarship harming the Constitution itself. This Part describes each
of these elements of the book in turn.
A.

Lawyers and Law Professors are Trained Liars?

I add the question mark to the heading above as an homage to the first subpart of
Spitzer’s book, which is titled “Lawyers as Liars?”7 Spitzer does includes a question
mark after this phrase and even concludes the Chapter by proclaiming law an “honorable,
noble and – above all – necessary profession.”8 Yet, the great bulk of Chapter One’s
treatment of lawyers and the advocacy system leaves little question how Spitzer would
answer the questions presented above. Spitzer focuses on law as gladiatorial combat
between zealous advocates with little incentive or willingness to present or speak the
7
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truth. He quotes others to the effect that the “tenets of the legal profession often
‘encourages or even requires outright lying’”9 and the “gladiator using the weapons in the
courtroom is not primarily crusading after truth, but seeking to win.”10
According to Spitzer this indifference to truth starts in law school, and is drilled
home in practice. Lawyers, law students, and law professors are taught to doubt
objective material truth and to separate morals from law. The natural result of law
school, legal practice, and the adversary system is advocates who don’t care about the
truth of the matter, and serve only the narrow interests of their clients, not truth or
broader morality.
The irony of this account of the legal profession is that while Spitzer admits that
his version of the legal system may shock readers who find it “draconian or even
immoral,”11 he eventually concludes with a defense of lawyers, law schools, and the
advocacy system.12 This is because Spitzer’s actual target is not lawyers or the legal
profession, but law professors. The entire point of the description of the immoral
advocacy system and the congenital liars who inhabit it is to tar the majority of law
9
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professors whose only training is in law school, and whose only experience is as lawyers,
rather than a proper scholarly training in a PhD program.13 Scholarly inquiry is always
devoted to the search for truth, with no preconceived notions or specific answers in mind.
Spitzer notes that legal training and the practice of law are thus particularly ill-suited as
precursors to a life as a scholar. In contrast to all other PhD trained faculty, they have no
training in the “rules of inquiry” that govern research in the hard and social sciences.
This adds up to the bugaboo of “advocacy scholarship” in law schools, where law
professors come to a conclusion first, and then gather supporting arguments second.14
It’s worth noting, however, that from the title of the book to the bulk of the
material in Chapter One Spitzer is attempting a sleight of hand. Spitzer promises us an
argument for “Saving the Constitution from Lawyers” and that he will explain “How
Legal Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning.” The book is frankly
silent on the first of these points. At the absolute maximum Spitzer provides an argument
against the constitutional theorizing of law professors that appears in law reviews. The
book spends little time on the actual arguments that lawyers put forth in court in
constitutional cases. Spitzer never argues that it’s wrong for a lawyer to advocate
zealously on behalf of her client. Nor does he argue that any particular constitutional
analysis by lawyers is bad or wrong. To the contrary, Spitzer is worried about academic
legal writing in law reviews and its propensity towards “the cultivation of wayward
constitutional theorizing.”15 When he discusses the theorizing that lawyers do to win
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cases he seems positively sanguine.16 I suppose that “Saving the Constitution from Law
Professors and Law Reviews” would have been a much less catchy title, but it would
have been vastly more accurate.
B.

Law Reviews Make It Worse

In Chapter Two Spitzer argues that the flaws in the student-run law review system
magnify the problems with the law professoriate exponentially. It begins with a short
history of the law review system and a description of how it currently operates.
Spitzer’s basic attitude towards student-edited law reviews can be easily summed
up: “To the contemporary academic world, the decision to allow students to create and
run an academic publication, especially at a flagship university, might seem puzzling,
even inexplicable.”17 By comparison, most other academic disciplines use the “gold
standard” if peer review, rather than student-editing.18 This inexplicable situation has
multiple problematic results, and anyone who’s familiar with the anti-law review
literature will recognize them. There are too many law reviews.19 Law review writing
suffers from excess “length, redundancy, and footnoting.”20 More worrisome is that law
students are not experts in what they publish, and therefore choose to publish poor,
biased, or incorrect scholarship.21
Spitzer does recognize that as a historical matter law reviews used to publish
articles that were more practitioner-oriented, and that students are better situated to
16
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review and edit that type of scholarship.22 Like Spitzer’s late defense of the advantages
of the advocacy system and law school training for lawyers, Spitzer offers a limp
description of the advantages of the law review system noting that “law reviews publish
many excellent articles,”23 that they are a good educational experience for the students,24
and that Spitzer himself has published in law reviews.25 Spitzer likewise recognizes that
peer-review can result in demonstrably incorrect scholarship, citing the plagiarism
charges against Stephen Ambrose and Doris Kearns Goodwin and the
fabricated/misrepresented evidence used by Michael Bellesiles and John Lott.26
Nevertheless, Spitzer concludes quite firmly that peer review is demonstrably superior to
student-editing, and that the problems with student-editing provide “a uniquely wide and
fertile opportunity for the cultivation and propagation of wayward constitutional
theories.”27
C.

Three Case Studies of Harmful, “Wayward Constitutional Theories”

Chapters Three, Four and Five are the heart of Spitzer’s book and its most
original contribution. Spitzer argues that the combination of ill-trained law
professors/advocates writing in student-run law reviews has resulted in dangerously
wrong scholarship that has later created bad public policy or even erroneous judicial
decisions. If Spitzer is right that law training and law reviews “distort” constitutional
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meaning Spitzer has greatly raised the stakes on the somewhat well-worn complaints in
Chapters One and Two of the book.
Spitzer notes three different problematic constitutional interpretations that he
claims arose as a result of poor scholarship: the idea of a constitutionally inherent lineitem veto, as suggested in the presidency of George H.W. Bush (Chapter 3), the strong
unified executive theory claimed by George W. Bush following 9/11 (Chapter 4), and the
“individual right” theory of the Second Amendment (Chapter 5).
Each chapter follows the same basic pattern. Spitzer begins each by laying out
what he considers a deeply erroneous constitutional argument that nevertheless received
support in law review articles. He notes that the governmental actors involved relied
upon faulty scholarship as support for their poor decisions. He then lays out, in great
detail, why he disagrees with the argument, usually relying on a battle over the historical
record at the time of the Founders and/or case law. Spitzer then uses each of these
examples to prove that poor law review scholarship has thus wrought serious harm upon
the Constitution itself.
The book closes in Chapter 6 with some possible solutions to the problem that
Spitzer identifies. These solutions include making law school look more like graduate
school in political science, making law reviews look more like traditional peer-reviewed
publications, and limiting the scope of legal academic scholarship to more traditional
legal analysis.
II.

Lawyers, Law Professors, and Law Students
Spitzer’s argument relies on three key critiques of lawyers, law professors, and

law reviews, each of which is quite problematic.

A. Lawyers as Liars
Spitzer provides the first leg of the defense himself: he admits to being a
supporter of the adversary system, the role of lawyers in that system, and the training
lawyers receive as a precursor to operating in that system. Thus, Spitzer himself
concedes that the Constitution needs no saving from lawyers operating as lawyers.28 To
the contrary, constitutional interpretation by lawyers in legal cases is obviously advocacy
on the part of their client, and to be viewed as such.
Moreover, Spitzer’s basic point – that lawyers are congenitally pre-disposed to
bend the truth or outright lie – is overblown and hardly reflects the reality of law practice
or law school. First, Spitzer is a political scientist, so he should certainly understand that
lawyers, like politicians, are often called upon to put the best face on unfortunate
circumstances. As any marginally decent lawyer (or politician) will report, outright lying
or evasion is rarely, if ever, the most effective strategy.29 To the contrary, lawyers who
are interested in serving their clients and winning do their very best to massage the facts
and present the best possible case they can, consistent with both the good and bad facts.30
One of the oddities about Spitzer’s book is his naïve insistence on a single,
absolute truth, both in matters of constitutional interpretation and in lawsuits. In
Spitzer’s world, one side to a lawsuit must be “lying,” because there is an objective truth
28
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to be discovered and only one side’s story can be true.31 In lawsuits, as in life, there are
two sides to every story. Witnesses naturally remember and shade events differently,
often to their own benefit. The adversarial system is not capable of, or aimed to, discover
the absolute truth of past events. No human system can accomplish that. To the
contrary, the adversary system lets each side tell their story and then allows fallible
decision-makers (either judges or juries) to choose whom to believe.
Moreover, it is flatly incorrect to say that law schools train lawyers to disregard
the truth. To the contrary, since the 1970s law schools have added layer upon layer of
legal ethics training.32 Law schools do train students that law is often indeterminate (i.e.
there is not necessarily a single clear answer to every legal question),33 but law schools
rarely tell students anything about the truth or falsity of the facts in the cases they study.
B. Law Professors as Incompetents
Spitzer’s critique of law professors, however, cuts closer to the bone. It is
certainly true that the bulk of American law professors (this author included) have no
additional graduate degrees beyond a JD or other law related degree. It is also true that
the pursuit of a JD in law school is quite different from the pursuit of a PhD in the social
sciences.
Spitzer’s critique does a nice job of highlighting the hybrid nature of the law
professoriate. On the one hand, unlike political scientists, law professors serve a critical
pre-professional function of training lawyers for the practice of law. Given that student
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tuition supplies the great bulk of the revenue supporting law schools, and the important
role that lawyers play in the functioning of our government and democracy, the need for
satisfactory teaching of law students is absolutely critical. In short, most, if not all, law
professors should be able to teach the practice of law, which likely requires that they have
attended law school and had some experience as lawyers.
On the other hand law professors are also required to publish scholarship,34 and as
Spitzer points out, contemporary law professors often publish articles directly utilizing
the tools and approaches of other academic disciplines.35 Often these law professors do
not hold advanced degrees in these disciplines, and may not have been trained at all in
those disciplines.36 It may, in fact, be true that law professors should think twice before
writing in these areas, and it may also be true that law reviews should be cautious about
publishing “law and” scholarship from scholars without the requisite backgrounds or
bona fides.
That said, Spitzer misses a key fact about lawyers and law professors. The job of
a lawyer invariably involves “law and,” as a lawyer’s practice always involves some
outside activity, from medical practice, to construction, to banking, plus the governing
law. If one speaks to a medical malpractice lawyer, she will tell you that she often feels
like she understands the procedures at issue in her cases batter than the doctors she
deposes. Similarly, legal standards and cases are not ever solely about the law, so the
study of an area of the law necessarily requires outside expertise. Antitrust scholars must
34
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understand economics. Securities regulations scholars must understand stock offerings.
The study of law, like the job of the law professor, naturally involves a breadth of
knowledge and expertise in areas outside of law. Law professors, like lawyers, are often
forced to pick up this expertise on the fly. In many cases this has worked out quite
nicely.37 It’s also worth noting that Spitzer’s biggest beef is with the historical research
of various law professors on constitutional issues, and Spitzer himself is not a trained
historian.38
Moreover, it would be impossible for law professors to teach or write about
Constitutional law without delving into the underlying history of the Constitution. This is
so because the Supreme Court has regularly relied upon historical antecedents
(particularly from the time of the founders) in analyzing the Constitution. As such, both
practicing lawyers and law professors are continually required to comb the historical
record. Whether or not courts and lawyers are good at exploring the historical record,
and whether the Supreme Court should try to avoid basing decisions upon difficult and
spotty historical records, are different questions. The fact remains that in these
circumstances lawyers and judges must explore the historical record to decide what the
“right” answer is based upon history. In this regard, law professors are doing no more or
less than courts have required of them.
Lastly, Spitzer is actually too circumspect in only suggesting that poorly trained
law professors should decline to write about constitutional interpretation. Given that it’s
37
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true that most law professors were trained in law school instead of another PhD program
and assuming that renders them poorly trained for true scholarly inquiry and inevitably
prone to flawed “advocacy” scholarship published by unwitting student-run law reviews,
shouldn’t we be dubious of all legal scholarship? If there are examples of “wacky” or
“bizarre” scholarship outside of constitutional law that have had deleterious effects, they
would greatly strengthen Spitzer’s thesis. If there are no such examples that would
naturally undercut the thesis.
C. Law Reviews
Spitzer himself recognizes that much law review scholarship is good,39 and there
is a certain irony that so many of the sources he uses to buttress his critique of the legal
profession, law professors and law reviews come from law reviews and/or law professors
themselves. For example, Chapter One’s critique of the adversary system rightly cites
and quotes many of the foundational works,40 including influential commentaries by law
professors Stephen Gillers,41 Monroe Freedman,42 Deborah Rhode,43 Geoffrey Hazard,44
Marvin Frankel,45 and David Luban.46 Likewise, both Spitzer’s argument about the
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insufficiency and inappropriateness of legal training for scholarly work and the evils of
student run law reviews rely heavily on influential works, often in law reviews, by law
professors.47
Again, Spitzer presents many fair critiques of the law review system. There are
probably too many law reviews, and it is true that some bad scholarship is published
every year. It’s also true that law review articles tend to be too long, and are in some
cases poorly written.48
Nevertheless, Spitzer’s argument does not rest upon stylistic concerns. Spitzer
needs to prove that student-edited law reviews are more likely to publish biased or flatly
incorrect scholarship than peer-reviewed journals. On this front, I do not think he carries
the day.
Most importantly, I do not think law reviews are more likely to publish false
information. To the contrary, I think they are less likely to. Anyone who has published
with an American law review knows that there is one thing that students excel at, often to
the great consternation of authors: cite checking. Students ask that almost every
proposition have a cite, and then they check each and every cite within an article to make
Chapter One’s discussion would have been enriched by including WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE (1998) and MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994), two of the absolute best
books in this area. Glendon is cited later in the discussion of “advocacy scholarship.” SPITZER, supra note
__ at 30 & nn. 85-86.
47
On the inability of law professors to write true scholarship Spitzer quotes and cites law professors
(among others) Anthony Kronman, Arthur Miller, and Lee Epstein (with co-author and political scientist
Gary King). See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993) cited and quoted on p. 23 & n. 56; Arthur S. Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and
Writing, 18 CATH. U. LAW REV. 291 (1969) cited and quoted on p. 24 & nn. 58-59; Lee Epstein & Gary
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (2002) cited and quoted on pp. 25, 29 & nn. 64, 80-82;
Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (2002) cited and quoted on p. 30 & n. 84. On
the various problems with student-edited law reviews Spitzer cites (among others) law professors James
Lindgren, Bernard Hibbitts, Lawrence Friedman, Richard Posner, Fred Rodell, and Robert Stevens on pp.
33-49 & nn. 2-74.
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I have not read as many peer reviewed poli sci journals as I have law reviews, but I have read enough to
know that stilted or repetitive writing and articles that add incrementally, if at all, to the existing literature
are not a unique problem to law reviews.

sure it matches the proposition. By contrast peer-reviewed journals generally rely upon
their authors to verify the accuracy of their footnotes and propositions.49 This means that
at a minimum whatever an author says in the text that is followed by a footnote is
extremely likely to be true, and that the reliance upon fabricated evidence that occurred in
some famous peer-reviewed work would have been impossible in a law review.
Spitzer also claims that student-edited law reviews are more likely to publish
slanted or biased scholarship (advocacy scholarship). As an initial matter I’ll note that
Spitzer’s own book is hardly a paragon of neutrality. He calls Justices Alito and Roberts
liars,50 accuses John Ashcroft of “shocking incompetence”51 and chooses as its examples
of “wayward” or “bizarre” constitutional thinking only actions during the presidencies of
George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, when Bill Clinton certainly pushed the legal
envelope during his last years in office.52 This selection of issues, and the description of
the Second Amendment issue as an open and shut case certainly raise the question of
whether Spitzer’s own book suffers from bias. I will also note that Spitzer is not alone,
and truly unbiased scholarship in the social sciences is relatively hard to come by.53
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I have published in a peer-reviewed journal, Benjamin H. Barton, Is There a Correlation Between Law
Professor Publication Counts, Law Review Citation Counts, and Teaching Evaluations? An Empirical
Study, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 618 (2008), and am on the Board of Edirots of The Clinical Law Review, a
peer-reviewed journal, and it is certainly not true that peer reviewed publications sweat the footnotes the
way that student-edited law reviews do. Cf. Max Schanzenbach, Peer-Reviewed versus Student-Edited
Journals, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES BLOG,
http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/02/peerreviewed_ve.html (noting the cite checking
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Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705-06 (1997) (holding unanimously that sitting presidents generally
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Executive Privilege and Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2000)
(describing various Clinton strategies to expand executive privilege).
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Like our disagreement over the “truth” and “lies” at trial, this is an area where Spitzer and I simply
disagree. Writing is by its nature persuasive, and in one form or another bias is natural. This is one of the

Spitzer also notes that student editors can allow undeserved authorial hyperbole
about the importance of their work.54 Given that Spitzer’s own book title claims to save
the Constitution from lawyers, while actually addressing the malignant force of law
review articles, I will let this claim speak for itself. Hyperbole may be distasteful, but
hardly a danger to the Constitution.
Lastly, Spitzer notes that student editors may not force an author to include
outside materials that disprove the author’s thesis. This is a legitimate worry. Student
editors do a masterful job of making sure everything the author cites is true, but they may
be underequipped to know when some other source or author’s work should be included.
This is where the overabundance of law reviews is actually a benefit. With the sheer
volume of published information it is extremely unlikely that a controversial and wrong
idea that draws any attention will stay unrebutted for long.
The three examples Spitzer offers are instructive on this point. In each case there
were multiple law review articles (as well as books and peer-reviewed articles) on both
sides of the issue,55 and whether or not Spitzer thought some were clearly wrong and
others were clearly right, system-wide the information was there for readers, policymakers and judges to make their own call on the issues.56
III.

Spitzer’s Three Examples

reasons why much law scholarship has drifted towards empirical work, although empirical work can
certainly suffer from biases as well.
54
SPITZER, supra note __ at 1-3.
55
Spitzer cites to these articles throughout the footnotes of Chapters 3-5, and the sheer volume of cited
material makes clear that whatever else can be said about these debates there certainly was a full and open
debate where everyone (including Spitzer) had a chance to state their case.
56
For Spitzer’s thesis to hold it is not enough that some law review articles he disagreed with were
published, it’s necessary that these articles were so invidious that they harmed the Constitution itself. If the
ideas were given a full airing though, it’s hard to see how the harm (if indeed there is harm) can be imputed
to the law review system or the law professoriate.

As noted above the first two parts of Spitzer’s book present relatively well worn
criticisms of law professors and law reviews. It’s Spitzer’s three examples and his theory
that law professors and law reviews combine to endanger the Constitution that is his
unique contribution. Nevertheless, Spitzer’s three examples have two main flaws. The
first is Spitzer’s insistence that the history underlying parts of the Constitution is so clear
that the arguments he debunks are not only wrong, but wrong enough that they never
should have been published and are, in fact, dangerous to the Constitution. The second is
Spitzer’s weak case for causation. While the proposed government actions that Spitzer
derides were partially supported by law review articles, it’s very dubious the law reviews
actually caused anything. To the contrary, the government actions at issue would have
occurred with or without academic support. The scholarly support was, at best, a gloss
on decisions already made.
A.

The Fallacy of Constitutional Correctness

As I’ve noted above Spitzer seems surprisingly earnest for a Political Scientist. In
each of his three areas of constitutional inquiry Spitzer seems utterly convinced that there
is a single right and wrong answer to the issue at hand, and that those who disagree with
him should simply be shamed into silence by the sheer force of his arguments.
Nevertheless, any historian of constitutional theory will note that changes (both large and
small) within constitutional law were attributable as much (or more) to changes in
Supreme Court personnel and national preferences than to any claim to the “correctness”
of the underlying constitutional theory or history. Spitzer forgets that the history of
constitutional law is written by the winners, not by law professors or political scientists.

Constitutional “correctness” is never set in stone, it’s played out over years of decisions
across differently assembled Courts.
Spitzer’s last example, the individualist view of the Second Amendment, makes
this weakness particularly clear.57 Spitzer calls the individualist view “stunningly and
fatally defective,”58 “erroneous” and “nonsensical,”59 “startling,”60 rife with “obvious
problems,”61 “wayward,”62 and based upon an “imaginary past.”63 He makes repeated
sweeping and unequivocal statements like “[n]othing in the history, construction, or
interpretation of the amendment applies or infers [an individual right].”64
He ravages the historical arguments for the individualist view. He then reviews
the Supreme Court’s pre-2008 Second Amendment case law and concludes that the cases
are crystal clear in meaning, and all unquestionably support a collective rights
interpretation. Spitzer doesn’t stop there though. He argues that the Supreme Court’s
various denials of cert. over the last years also signal the “inescapable conclusion . . . that
the Supreme Court simply has no inclination to revisit the issue.”65 In other words,
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The “individualist view” of the Second Amendment argues that “the ownership of firearms is a
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that the

Spitzer argues that the current Supreme Court is against the individualist view of the
Second Amendment.66
The timing of Spitzer’s book is, in this regard, quite unfortunate for Spitzer. The
Supreme Court essentially fully adopted the individual rights argument in District of
Columbia v. Heller67 this summer, just months after publication of Spitzer’s book. In
fact, while Heller was a 5-4 decision, it was unanimous on the underlying constitutional
theory: all nine Justices recognized some form of the individual rights theory of the
Second Amendment.68 Spitzer’s book spends forty-seven pages rejecting this same
constitutional theory as clearly, laughably, foolishly incorrect.
Given my general disregard for expansive claims of obvious constitutional
correctness I am hesitant to criticize Spitzer too much for his Second Amendment
chapter. If a different group of Justices decided Heller in a different time they might well
agree with Spitzer. Nevertheless, Spitzer has written a book that argues that the
supporters of the individualist right theory are not only wrong, they are so wrong that
their scholarship never should have been published and their work is dangerous. In this
circumstance it seems perfectly appropriate to point out that Heller’s unanimous
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SPITZER, supra note __ at 143 (“The inescapable conclusion is that the Supreme Court has considered
the matter settled and has no interest in crowding its docket with cases that merely repeat what has already
been decided.”).
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128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
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See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790-2805 (majority opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and
Kennedy); Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (“The
question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a ‘collective right’ or an
‘individual right.’ Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals.”). See also Glenn H.
Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035, 2035
(“What Heller is most notable for is its complete and unanimous rejection of the “collective rights”
interpretation that for nearly seventy years held sway with pundits, academics, and--most significantly-lower courts.”

repudiation of Spitzer’s theory cripples his overall thesis, and well establishes the maxim
that one should think carefully before committing hyperbole in the written word.69
B.

Causation, Causation, Causation

Aside from the rather unfortunate example of the Second Amendment, Spitzer has
little evidence of allegedly “harmful” scholarship infecting court decisions.70 Instead
Chapters three, four and five are all largely critical of executive branch reliance on faulty
scholarship.71 The problem with these chapters is that while the executive branch
partially relied upon the scholarship Spitzer derides as faulty, it’s again quite naïve to
think that this scholarship actually caused any of these actions.
First, it’s worth wondering about the influence of law reviews altogether. Spitzer
himself notes that law reviews are cited less frequently by courts and are utilized less
frequently by practicing lawyers than ever before.72
Moreover, even if law reviews were influential, a political scientist like Spitzer
should certainly understand that the actual effect of a law review article on the behavior
or decisions of judges, let alone other governmental actors, is quite limited. Political
scientists have spent years building the literature of the attitudinal model, which argues
that judges decide cases on the basis of their political preferences, not any deep
understanding or analysis of the law, and then add the legal discussion as a justification
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Moreover, while Spitzer is quite critical of law school and legal practices insistence that there are two
sides to most issues, some of that equivocation would have served him well in writing this book. It’s hard
to imagine a lawyer of an ability ever making the sweeping claims of correctness Spitzer makes here.
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Four covers George W. Bush’s claims to expansive executive privilege. Chapter Five includes a critique of
John Ashcroft’s position on the Second Amendment.
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SPITZER, supra note __ at 47, 180-81.

for their pre-determined decision.73 Under the attitudinal theory judges make up their
minds first based on political preference, and then fill in the blanks later on. Under this
model of judicial decision-making the most you could say about law review articles in a
judicial opinion is that they are used as support for decisions that were already made.
If this is the case for judges (as the attitudinal model suggests), it has to be doubly
true for political actors like white house or justice department officials. It is a historical
fact that lawyers in the first Bush White House argued for an inherent constitutional line
item veto and in the second Bush White House for uniquely powerful unitary executive
and commander-in-chief powers. It is also true that in justifying these claims the White
House used law review articles, among other areas of support. I’ll even grant that it may
be true that both Bush White Houses were wrong on the merits (although that’s a much
harder question).
It is untrue and quite naïve, however, to assert that a law review article “caused”
either Bush White House to make these claims. In fact, Spitzer himself recognizes that
the George W. Bush brief in support of expanded presidential powers “reveals an
administration that had already decided on the direction in which it wished to proceed
and had gone in search of a post hac legal justification to legitimize conclusions already
drawn.”74
These decisions were made politically, and the law review support was added as a
post hac defense. If the law review articles cited by Spitzer had been rejected by peer
review, would these White House efforts been stillborn? Hardly. The lawyers at issue
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would have gone forward with what they had as support, regardless. The law reviews
were at best icing on the cake. More likely they were a cynical gloss added to support
decisions made politically, not on the basis of the actual “truth” or “correctness” of the
constitutional theories presented.
IV.

CONCLUSION
“Saving the Constitution from Lawyers” does raise some challenging issues about

the nature of the law professoriate, and its interaction with student-edited law reviews.
Spitzer taps into the variety of issues that come with the hybrid nature of law schools: we
are professional schools that also produce serious scholarly research, and sometimes the
training and qualifications for each are not coextensive.
That said, Spitzer fails at his main goal of proving a danger to the U.S.
Constitution from faulty scholarship. Spitzer may have a legitimate disagreement over
the scholarship he pillories, but it is too much for him to prove that the scholarship is so
wrong as to be dangerous.75
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So, rest easy America, the Constitution will be fine.

